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1.lntroduction. 
The process of wage bargaining has been analyzed in the literature in various ways. There is a 
strand of the Iiterature that ignores the implicit negotiation problem and stresses on the analysis of 
wage outcomes. 1 Another relevant strand of the Iiterature tries to model the strategic bargaining 
problem and its solution. Following this line, early work focused on explaining why union's wage 
demands should fall during a conflict.2 During the eighties, the developments in noncooperative 
bargaining theory help in explaining the union's c1aims by specifying the negotiation procedure in 
detail.3 For instance, Admati and Perry (1987) show that, in an incomplete information context, agents 
could strategically delay agreements. More recently, Cramton and Tracy (1992, 1994) consider a 
model of wage bargaining with multiple and time-varying threats. In both cases, the formation of the 
initial c1aim and offer, both of which are conditional on the bargaining procedure, is described in 
detail. 
For analyzing empirically the wage bargaining process we have sufficient data on wage and 
strike outcomes. However, there is dearth of data on the sequence of offers and counteroffers that 
agents make. Although some authors try to circumvent this problem by means of experimental 
evidence,4 to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical work using real data on the sequence of 
offers. We dispose of a data set on initial bargaining offers that could help us shed some light on the 
empirical relevance of sorne features of the bargaining process. 
In more detail, we analyze the determinants of the union's initial claim and the firm's initial 
offer in the context of a private-information model of union contract negotiations.s Assuming the firm 
has private-information about its willingness to pay, we want to know how the union tries to screen 
this information using its first initial c1aim. From the point ofview ofthe firm offer, we would like to 
evaluate the amount of information the initial offer reveals, given the bargaining procedure and the 
aggregate information. Furthermore, we would Iike to assess whether or not the union incorporates the 
common knowledge information to its initial c1aim in a different way that what the firm does. 
Formally, our empirical approach could be understood as an adaptation of the Cramton and Tracy 
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(1992, 1994) model to the current Spanish bargaining structure. However, the analysis is conditional 
on particular characteristics of the collective bargaining and the bargaining procedure in Spain. This 
is such that, after a given union's initial, the firm is forced to counteroffer before a given deadline 
(usually a week after the c1aim was made). In such circumstance, the offer reveals little information 
regarding the firm (for instance, in 1987, 47.0 per cent of the offers were equal to the nationwide 
employers association reference offer), as against what we find in Cramton and Tracy framework. 
This empirical exercise is carried out using a sample of large firms from the "Negociación 
Colectiva en las Grandes Empresas en España" (NCGE), a yearly survey on bargaining and other 
issues conducted by the Spanish Ministry ofEconomy. It provides data on initial bargaining positions, 
negotíation timing, strike activity, wage increase settlements and other relevant economic variables 
(see the Appendix). 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In section 11 we describe the most relevant features and 
figures of the Spanish negotiation framework. The empirical model and the econometric specification 
are described in section III. The main results are presented in section IV. Finally, section V conc1udes. 
11. Spanish negotiation framework and data. 
a. Spanish negotiationframework. 
Bargaining procedures in Spain, as in other European countries, are quite different from those 
in the US or Canada.6 Bargaining occurs at industry-wide and firm levels simuitaneously, terms of 
industry-wide agreements being a binding floor for all firms in the sector, Le., the so-caBed 
"mandatory extension" principie. Union's affiliation is low but its power is high because unions carry 
negotiations at industry-wide leve!. The coverage of the system is notably high. During the period 
1984-91, almost 82 per cent of all employees were covered by collective agreements and 20 per cent 
ofthese correspond to firm-Ievel agreements in large firms. 
Most employees have indefinite contracts. Current working and payment conditions are settled 
in an additional protocol called "convenio colectivo" which stipulates the wages and hours of work 
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over a number of years. However, wage increases are negotiated or renegotiated on a near yearly 
basis. Elected works councils substitute unions in firm-level negotiations and, as a major difference to 
other European countries, can can for a strike. It seems that the main motivation of the decision to 
negotiate at the firm-level bargaining in Spain is to distribute firm-specific quasi-rents (Palenzuela 
and Jimeno, 1996). 
The negotiation at the firm-level proceeds as fonows. It starts when the council makes a wage 
increase claim. The institutional setting is such that the firm must counteroffer immediately or, at 
least, before a given deadline. If this offer equals the aboye c!aim, there is an immediate agreement. If 
not, they alternate offers until they reach an agreement. Meanwhile, the council uses a latent strike 
threat. However, it is unusual to can for a strike before both the c!aim and the offer are made, Le. the 
wage increase platform is announced. Additionally, both of the agents involved receive aggregate 
(and industry) signalling. At the aggregate level, the employers association recommends to its 
members an initial offer (reference offer, RO). Likewise, nationwide unions recommend an initial 
claim (reference claim, RC) to their works council members. 
b. Aggregate and sample evidence about wage bargaining 
In Table 1 we summarize sorne characteristics of the negotiation process in the NCGE and 
sorne aggregate determinants during 1982-1993. During the period 1982-86, with the exception of 
1984, there were annual nationwide agreements which guided firm-level negotiations. Nationwide 
agreements fixed a wage change band which acted as a reference point in fixing industry or firm level 
settlements. From 1987, there have not been any nationwide agreements, but the nationwide 
employers association and the most powerful unions have respectively announced yearly reference 
offers and claims.7 Note that (comparing the first and the second period mentioned) the existence of 
an aggregate agreement in a given year reduces the length ofthe negotiation process at the firm-Ievel. 
Notice also that for the entire period, the level of conflicting activity has been significantly low. This 
is a consequence of both, a very low conditional duration of strikes (not higher than five days) and a 
strike incidence between 10 and 15 per cent.8 In Figure 1 we plot the observed (average) initial claim, 
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initial offer and agreement against the inflation rate in 1982-1993. The persistent difference between 
both initials highlights the presence of sorne kind of private information regarding the level of 
profitability of firms. FinaHy, we must point out that, with one exception (1987), the inflation rate is 
higher than the inflation target fixed by the government. 
In Table 2 we distinguish four distinct types of outcomes of the bargaining process. The most 
common outcome (column 1) implies an unknown sequence of alternating offers after a works council 
initial claim and a firm's initial offer (that is, at least three offers are necessary in reaching an 
agreement). It shows strike incidence of 16 per cent and a negotiation length of slightly aboye three 
months. The other three types of outcomes (columns 2 to 4) are related to initial claims and/or initial 
offers accepted. In aH these cases both the strike incidence and the length of negotiation are lower 
than in regular disagreement outcomes. As expected, the lowest strike incidence and length of 
negotiation is achieved when the firm accepts the union's initiaJ claim (column 2). Notice also the 
relatively high strike incidence when work councils get initial claim but only after being initial1y 
rejected. This type of outcome implies that works council's wage concession curves are horizontal 
with respect to the length of negotiations. 
Table 3 provides further information about how initial positions are generated. Both of them 
are, in a great majority of cases, aboye their respective reference offers. With respect to firm offers, 
several comments are in order. First, it seems that any initial firm offer must be (to be credible) as 
high as the RO, which is closely related to the government's inflation target. Second, there is an 
important fraction of offers that coincide with the RO, which in turn has very little information about 
the true demand state of the firmo In regard to offers below or aboye the RO, we pose the foHowing 
empirical question: do they signal to the works council the demand state of the firm or do they reflect 
the influence of the observables (either aggregate or bargaining unit information)? On the part of 
works council claim, there is also an important fraction of claims which coincides with the RC. Note 
also the increase in the fraction of claims from that faH below the RC as this may reflect a change of 
strategy on part of the employees. 
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Finally, in Figure 2, we show, year by year, the relationship between the initial claim and offer 
and the nationwide reference points: that of the employers' association (vertical line) and that of 
nationwide unions (horizontalline). Two clear pattems arise. On the one hand, the fraction of claims 
below the Re is greater in the latter part ofthe sample periodo While on the other, the fraction of offer 
below the RO decreases in the latter part of the sample periodo On the other hand, note that there is 
little relationship between claim and offers in any of the years considered implying that works 
councils' claims have limited influence in employers' offers. 
111. Economic and econometric framework. 
As mentioned before, the Spanish bargaining framework is such that bargaining starts at the 
time the works council makes an initial wage c!aim, w~ (in logs). In signaling models, the claim is 
assumed to be a function of what the un ion (works councils in our case) expects a unit of labor is 
worth for the firm (q/l ) and, simultaneously, other reduced-form determinants Xi/. Formally: 
t=l, ... ,T¡ ;i=l, ... ,N [1] 
where f/ is a firm specific component and Ui~ is a serially uncorrelated error termo The main 
prediction from signalling models is such that ac must be positive. That is, higher expected 
profitability implies higher expected claim. 
On the part of the firm, the underline initiaJ wage offer, w¡~, is made taking into account the 
aboye claim, knowing the true value of q¡/ 
t=l, ... ,T¡ ;i=l, ... ,N [2] 
where ¡;O is a firm specific component and u~ is a serially uncorrelated error termo After the claim 
has being announced, the firm decides either to accept such a claim or make, before a formal deadline 
(at time k), a counteroffer, (w~ ), which is related to the underline offer in the following way: 
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W~ =Wi~ if w~ ~w~ [3] 
° C if O1,O't >W,C'tWiI=Wi¡ 1' ' 
Consequently, the observed initial offer is censored from aboye by the initial c1aim. Note that 
those observations in which the c1aim has been accepted are very Iittle informative about the 
underline offer. In that case, we should proceed is to restriet the estimation sample to those 
observations in which the claim has been rejected (informative offers) while considering the selection 
induced by the rejection of the initial c1aim. However, given the fact that the censoring oecurs in a 
very Iittle fraction of cases (less than four per cent of the cases), we proceed as there are no censoring 
problems, i.e., 
° - C fJ X f.o o •W,t -YoW it +aoqit + ° it + i +Uit ' if Sil =0 [4] 
where Sil= 1 ifthe initial c1aim is accepted by the firm and zero otherwise. 
The characteristies of the Spanish bargaining structure restricts the kind of theoretical model 
we can take as a reference. For instance, having at least one offer from each agent (without fixed 
intervals between offers), we may reject both a screening model in which the union makes all the 
offers (Hayes, 1984, and Card, 1990) and an alternating offers model with a fixed interval between 
offers (Grossman and Perry, 1986, and Kennan and Wilson, 1989). Recently Cramton and Traey 
(1992 and 1994) have proposed a signalling model with multiple threats or time-varying threats that is 
adequate to represent, at least partially, the underlining negotiation structure of our data. 
In the first work mentioned, when the counteroffer is made at a freely chosen time, say r, it 
reveals all the prívate information of the firmo In fact the counteroffer is a Rubinstein offer and is 
immediately accepted by the union. In such cireumstances, the offer is fulIy informative. However, 
the Spanish institutional setting is such that firms must counteroffer immediately or, in any case, 
before a given deadline, say at time k. Consequently, we do not expect the firm offer to reveal much 
of the firm information. Thus, in the Spanish case, the offer is, in most of the cases, non-informative. 
Consequently, the key eoefficient of the offer equation, ao. must be close to zero. Note that for 
coherency Yo must be also close to zero. AdditionalIy, both the c1aim and the offer are expected to be 
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related, possibly in a very different manner, with both aggregate and firm specific variables, all of 
them which are in the vector X 
In essence, our c1aim and offer equations may be considered as standard wage equations and 
consequently, we can specify a dynamic structure for them. Learning or reputation may influence the 
current outcome of the negotiation process. Additionally, a single negotiation is embedded in an 
indefinite negotiation process. Thus, current negotiation cannot be isolated from past (or future) 
negotiation rounds. 
Given that the c1aim and offer data are not in levels, but are expressed as arate of change, we 
can rewrite a dynamic version ofboth equations as: 
Notice that in the latter case, the relevant sample is constructed by picking up at least two 
consecutive outcomes in which the initial claim is rejected. The sample constructed in such a way will 
be denoted as the offer sample. 'o Líkewíse, the original sample will be denoted as the claim sample. 
Regardíng the estímatíon of equations [5] and [6] -ignoríng the potential censoring problem- there are 
several important considerations. First, the unobservability of qu, the union's expectation about how 
worthy is a unit of work for the firmo We assume that agents are rational and following McCallum 
(1976) and Wickens (1982), we replace qu by qu and use instrumental variable methods. Second, 
least squares in any of both equations may produce inconsistent estimates as long as there are 
variables potentially correlated with either the error term or the idiosyncratic heterogeneity effect. We 
take into account both problems, not using a IV estimator over the first-differenceD equations of [5] 
and [6], but the (two-stage) estimation method proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator 
largely improves the performance of the first-differenced method alone, as recently noted by Blundell 
and Bond (1995). This method, in addition to the orthogonality restrictions implied by the first-
differenced equations {E(~u7tziS),k =c,o;t > s + l;t =3, ..,T¡} , also exploits the orthogonality 
restrictions among the error in either [5] or [6] with all the predetermined instruments 
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{E(u~¿jzjs),k=c,o;t>s;t=3, .. ,T¡} . A Sargan (1988) test evaluates the validity of the orthogonality 
restrictions employed. 
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IV. Empirical results. 
a. Data and variables 
As mentioned in section 1, the basic data source we use in the NGCE, an annual survey which 
offers information about collective bargaining of firms with more than two hundreds workers. The 
available sample covers a time span of 7 years, from 1985 to 1991. From the raw data set we select 
those observations which contain information about c1aim, offer, agreement, and the starting and the 
ending date of the negotíation process. The basic statistics of this data set are presented in the 
Appendix. 
We distinguish three groups of variables: those which correspond to specific c.haracteristics of 
the bargaining unit, those which refer to sorne features of the current or previous bargaining process 
and those which capture aggregate effects. 
In the first group, the value added per employee is included as a proxy for the firm's demando It 
is expected to push up the initial claim and to have Iittle (null) effect over the offer, given the 
characteristics of the Spanish bargaining framework. In addition, we also inc1ude the percentage of 
sales in the local market as an indirect measure of competitive pressure. 
Furthermore, in this group we also include a set of variables which account for potential 
differences between union power: the percentage of the workers within the council which belong to 
CCOO and UGT (the two most important nationwide unions), to middle sized unions, to regional 
unions and small groups of representatives (other groups inc/uding professional unions are omitted). 
We also consider a dummy which takes into account the presence of a single union within the works 
counci/. This is because a single union within the works council has no coordination problems and, as 
a result, could have a greater negotiatíon power. The size of the bargaining unit is controlled by the 
lagged number of employees. We also inc/ude the concession of a cost of living allowance c/ause in 
the previous year agreement. In order to capture the effect of the negotiation timing, we inc/ude a 
dummy if the negotiation process starts after the expiration of the last agreement about wage 
increases. 
At the aggregate level we distinguish between industrial and nation-wide effects. We inc/ude 
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the number of days lost by strike per employee in the industry which acts as a proxy for the aggregate 
bargaining pressure. An increase in the industry (or nationwide) unemployment rate or a decrease in 
the change of the industry employment level can be expected to lower both the claim and the offer. 
Higher the expected level of inflation,11 higher are expected to be both initials, as far as sufficiently 
many agent think of inflation as the minimum guaranteed wage change. 12 
Moreover, we also inc1ude the mean negotiated wage change settlement in the same region (or 
combination of regions, in the case of a multiplant bargaining unit) in the previous month. This 
variable proxies information that agents have about other bargaining units actions and could capture 
spillover effects (see McConnell, 1989). It should contribute to the improvement of our specification 
in at least two directions. First, it offers sorne demand information not directiy observable to the 
econometrician at the regional levels. Second, other firms' wage settlements may enter directly into 
wage negotiations through the reservation wage and/or the profit function. The former variables are 
dated at the beginning of the negotiation process in the claim and offer equations and are expected to 
put upward pressures over the outcome. 
Fina11y, nationwide unions and employers associatíon prescriptíons and aggregate 
unemployment variables (national rate of unemployment and national long-term unemployment) 
should playa crucial role in our proposal. They are expected to c10sely drive firm-Ievel initial offers. 
Notice that these variables, which only have time series varíation, are not identified when inc1uding 
time dummies as regressors. A set of industry dummies is also inc1uded. 
b. Resu/ts. 
In Table 4 we present the resuits of the estimation of the c1aim and offer equations using the 
GMM-IV method proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). We report the results of two different 
specifications for each equation. A11 the equations pass the standard testing procedures. In aH 
columns, we found absence of the second order autocorrelation in the first differences error term 
(which implies that the level error is white noise). Likewise, aH of them pass the Sargan (1988) test 
for the validity ofthe instruments. For coherency, the same set of instruments -except for that we did 
not inc1ude the lags ofthe offer in the c1aim equation- has been employed in all the equations. 
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[insert Table 4 here] 
As expected, the value added per employee plays a different role depending on the equation we 
considero It has a positive effect on the initial c1aim, Le., the unions translate increases in expected 
productivity into increases in their initial c1aims. On the contrary, the effect on the initial offer is 
statistically insignificant, a result which is expected given the structure of the bargaining process in 
Spain. Moreover, this key result remains unchanged when we assume the firm to be fully informed 
about q, that is, when we do not instrument the value added per employee in the offer equation. Thus, 
due to the short period in which the firms have to counteroffer, their initial offers do not reveal any 
information about their true situations. 
Regarding dynamic and contemporary cross effects, we found a negligible coefficient for the 
dynamic term in the c1aim equation and a positive and significant dynamic effect in the offer equation. 
Both results are consistent with the fact that the works council c1aims intends to screen the firm 
information and the firm offer tries not to reveal such information. As expected, the effect of the 
current claim on the current offer is unimportant. Moreover, the latter effect totally vanishes when we 
do not instrument the value added per employee, that is, when we assume the firm has no uncertainty 
on the value added per employee. From our point of view, this supports the following working 
hypothesis: the c1aim is less related to the observable information than the offer. Later in this section, 
we add more evidence to this particular hypothesis. 
As in the standard wage equation estimates for the Spanish economy,13 both claim and offer 
depend strongly on aggregate conditions. The effect of aggregate variables is even more prominent in 
the case of the offer equation. Regarding the effect of the aggregate employers association initial is 
higher in the offer equation than in the c1aim equation, whereas the reverse result is obtained for the 
aggregate union's initial. 
The effect of the national unemployment rate is more important than that of the industry 
unemployment rateo On the other hand, the nationallong-term unemployment rate has different effects 
in both equations. It has a positive effect in the offer equation, thereby reducing the stabilization role 
of the unemployment rate, as it was found in sorne studies when estimating wage equations for the 
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Spanish economy.14 The effect ofthis variable is insignificant in the claim equation. 
With respect to other aggregate variables we must point out that the level of industry 
conflicting activity reduces the degree of disagreement (reduces the claim and increases the offer, the 
former effect being greater in absolute value).15 The effect of the expected level of inflation is similar 
and highly significant in both equations. However, the (average) wage change negotiated at the 
regionallevel (which proxies for the available information at the starting ofthe bargaining process) is 
significant in the offer equation but not in the claim equation. 
It is also important to note that many observables referred to the characteristic ofthe bargaining 
unit enter differently, in size and/or in sign, in the two equations considered. Note that when the effect 
of a given variable has an opposite sign in the two initial offer equations, we can jointly interpret the 
two coefficients in terms of the degree of disagreement (i.e., the difference between claim and 
offer).16 In that sense, the degree of disagreement decreases when the negotiations start after the 
expiration of the former agreement, since there is less uncertainty and, increases with the size of the 
bargaining unit. The joint effect of union variables seems to indicate that the degree of disagreement 
decreases the more important is the presence of the powerful union groups within the works council. 
Finally, as expected, having indexed the previous agreement (which proxies the likelihood of getting 
indexation in the current negotiation), has a negative effect on both equations, larger in absolute value 
in the c1aim equation. 
V. Summary of findings and main conclusions 
Throughout this paper we have analyzed c1aim and offer setting using Spanish data from the 
NCGE. We have tried to assess how the initial offers are formed. The analysis has considered 
carefully the econometric methods and testing procedures that this kind of data requires. 
Since both initials must be announced at the very beginning of the bargaining process, we 
found that the works council claim tries to screen the level of profitability of the firmo Furthermore, 
we found that the firm offer does not reveal (on average) any of the firm information. In addition, the 
effect of aggregate variables seems to be more important for the initial offer than for the initial claim. 
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At the same time, employers and employees use the information from the bargaining unit 
characteristics in a very different way. 
Furthermore, both the initial claim and the initial offer are relatively more closely related to 
aggregate setting than to firm conditions. This il1ustrates the fact that the current system of wage 
bargaining leads to an inflationary bias. l ? This constitutes c1ear evidence in favor of the existence of 
sorne sort of wage rigidity in Spain caused, among other reasons, by the combination of the structure 
ofthe collective bargaining system and high firing costs for perrnanent workers. 
14 
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Notes. 
ITypical examples are the Efficiency Wages model [Solow (1979)] and also the Insider-Outsider model [ 
Solow (1985) and Lindbeck and Snower (1986)]. 
2See Kennan (1986) for a detailed survey ofearlier work. 
31n a crucial work, Rubinstein (1982) showed that the altemating offers game with complete 
information has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the first offer is accepted. [See 
Binrnore et al. (1992) for a survey oftheoretical work and Kennan and Wilson (1989 and 1993) for a survey of 
both theoretical and applied wage bargaining work.] 
4See Kennan and Wilson for (1993) for a recent survey. 
5 See Fudenberg, Levine and Ruud (1983), Morton (1983) and Hayes (1984) for earlier asymmetric models on 
wage negotiation and strike activity. 
6See Jimeno and Toharia (1994) for a description ofthe Spanish industrial relations system. 
7For instance, for 1998 a press release (Expansion, 01/15/98) from the main employers association 
(CEOE) states: "The employers association CEOE recommends to the employers a 1.1 per cent wage 
increase for the 1998 Collective Bargaining round, \.0 per cent below the govemment's inflation 
target. The employers association also advises to its affiliations affiliated not to accept any agreement 
regarding wage hours and temporary contracts." 
8See Jimenez-Martin et al. (1996) for an empirical analysis of strike incidence in Spain using the same 
data set. 
9We, instead, could have assumed a weaker assumption: the firm is more informed than employees 
about q. 
10ln general, we should take into account that E(uft/LJwi~ >LJwft) is not expected to be zero. However, 
when the censoring is very small (as in our case) the problem has a limited impact. In our case, similar 
qualitative and quantitative results are obtained independent1y of the sample employed (either the 
offer or the claim sample). 
11 In order to proxy the expected level of inflation we use an ARIMA forecast ofthis variable. 
18 
12The data show that agreements are in a great proportion above the expected level of inflation. In fact they are 
in many cases best linked to government target. 
13See Andres et al. (1993) for a survey of empirical results for wage equations in Spain. 
14 See Andres and Garcia (1993) and Dolado and Bentolila (1994). 
15Although there are several studies that inc1ude a measure of aggregate strike activity in firm-Ievel 
wage negotiations (Card (1990) is an example), the process of transmision from sectoral to firm level 
negotiations it is still unc1ear. 
I~ote that a greater level of disagreement has strong consequences in the rest of the bargaining 
process. For instance, as illustrated by Jimenez-Martin et al. (1996), it increases the likelihood of 
observing a strike during the negotiation. 
17In words of Blanchard et al. (1995): "In the current system, each level of bargaining establishes a 
floor on the wages which can be set at the 10wer leve!. Sectoral-Ievel bargaining in effect sets a wage 
floor on firm-Ievel agreements, which can either set wages at the floor, or at a higher level. Thus, 
firms which are doing well can pay higher wages, but firms which are not doing so well are prevented 
from paying lower wages. The result is a wage setting system with an inflationary bias. rhe problem 
is likely to be particulariy acute in times when more re-allocation is needed, as has been the case in 
Spain with the rapid increase in openness and foreign trade." 
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Figure 1. ¡nitial claim and offer, agreement and inflation. 
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Table 1. Bargaining determinants and outcomes. 
AGGREGATE NCGESAMPLE 
BARGAINING BARGAINING OUTCOMES INFLA nON 
nationwide RO RC ciaim offer agree eneg estrike Target CPI 
year Agreement % % % % % days /lOurs % % 
1982 Ves 9 11 13.0 9.0 11.02 73 4.6 12.5 14.0 
1983 Ves 9.5 12.5 15.0 9.0 11.5 65 4.2 12.0 12.2 
1984 No 6.5 to 8 10 10.0 5.0 7.9 87 10.2 8.0 9.0 
1985 Ves 5.5 7.5 9.3 5.9 8.3 75 3.0 7.0 8.1 
1986 Ves 5.2 8.5 . 10.2 6.8 8.7 117 2.0 8.0 8.3 
1987 No 5.0 8.0 8.7 4.9 7.0 96 6.0 5.0 4.8 
1988 No 3 to 5 6 7.8 4.2 5.7 150 2.0 3.0 5.8 
1989 No 3 to 6 7 8.8 4.2 6.2 157 4.7 3.0 6.9 
1990 No 5 9 10.1 5.3 7.5 131 2.7 5.7 6.5 
1991 No 5 to 7 9 10.6 5.7 7.6 121 6.7 5.0 5.5 
1992 No 3 to 5 8 9.0 5.8 6.8 133 3.7 5.0 5.3 
1993 No 2 to 5 5+ 6.5 3.6 4.7 262 1.2 4.5 4.9 
RO: From 1982 to 1986 (except in 1984), lower bound ofthe nationwide recornmended agreement bando 
Since 1987, nationwide employer's recommended reference offer. 
RC: From 1982 to 1986 (except in 1984), upper bound ofthe nationwide recommended agreement bando 
Since 1987, nation wide union's recommended reference c1aim. 
1_neg: average length of negotiations. 
I_strike: Unconditional average number ofhours lost by strikes. 
Target: Goverment's inflation target. 
CPI: December to December Consumer Price Index. 
sources: NCGE and Circular para la Negociación Colectiva, Employers Association, 1994. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for different types of agreement. 
Regular Olltcome jirst ultio" jirst First 
Claim> ciaim accepted jirms' U"ion 
Agree> aftera offer Claim 
Offer cOllllteroffer accepted Accepted 
Claim 10.1 7.4 9.4 7.1 
Agreement 7.0 7.4 6.5 7. I 
Offer 5.2 5.8 6.5 7.1 
Strike illcidence 17.0 11.9 6.4 3.1 
Lengtil oflIegotiatiolls 100.7 95.7 74.6 47.5 
Observations 1861 42 171 97 
(per ce"t) (85.1 ) (1.9) (7.7) (4.4) 
Table 3. Claim and offer distribution with respect to reference initials. 
Offer Claim 
Year O<RO O=RO O>RO C<RC C=RC C>RC 
1985 17.2 17.3 65.5 4.8 19.3 75.9 
1986 15.2 0.0 84.8 13.0 14.5 72.5 
1987 18.6 47.0 34.4 20.6 25.9 53.5 
1988 4.5 16.4 79.1 8.7 11.0 80.3 
1989 1.4 13.3 85.3 39.7 18.7 41.6 
1990 13.5 16.2 70.3 23.2 27.1 49.7 
1991 8.7 29.5 61.8 25.3 30.7 44.0 
Notes: See below Table l. 
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Figure 2. Claim and Offer and aggregate initials in 1985-1991. 
,. ,. ,..¡------:--:---:----------, 
17' 17.5 17.5 
15 15 15 
12.5 12.5 12.5
"i .;;' ~ Cl" c., 
• I~ :" 
7' 
o '0 
.~:.: . m 'O m 'O 
7.' 7.':t:·,:: 
2' 2.' 2.' 
d 2.~ 5 7.~ ,12, 12. I~ .1. 21> d H 5 H .12, .2'.' I~ ,1.' 21> 2.5 7 ~e.! 12.5 15 17.5 2Ó 
YEAR 1985: 'RO=5.5 , YEAR 1986: 'RO=5.2 , YEAR 1987: 'RO=5.0, 
,. ,. ,. 
17.5 17.5 17.$ 
15 15 15 
12,$ 12.5 12.5
,., :;::. :'.::' c., ..:::::",:", 10 ...:.... ,. '0 . .: i:l :':':. ,,'o m ,;.:¡¡:i<: . m 'o 
7.' ;ti:.l 7' ~ ..--------1---+.:..;,::'.~q;;:.:.~:c-.:"" 7.' 
2.' 2' 2.' 
2. 75 12.5 15 17 5 20 2.5 7.5 ol~r 12.5 1$ 17.5 20 2.5 7.5 oWe 12.5 15 17.5 20ol,~, 
YEAR 1988: RO=3.0 , YEAR 1989: RO=3.0 , YEAR 1990: 'RO=5.0 , 
,. 
17' 
" 
12. 1: 
;1iI, 
o '0 
75 
25 1
2.' S 7.' lb 12.5 l~ 17.5 2Ó 
offer 
YEAR 1991: RO=50, 
Notes: RO: Nationwide employers' association reference offer. Re: Nationwide unions' reference claim. 
22 
Table 4. Initial c1aim and offer determination. 
CLAIM CLAIM OFFER OFFER 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
coef. t-st. coef. t-st. coef. t-st. coef. t-st. 
constant -0.4930 (0.11) -7.4107 (1.85) 2.0382 (0.92) -11.716 (5.51) 
lagged claiml -0.0058 (0.40) -0.0002 (0.01) 
lagged offerl 0.2172 (9.09) 0.1970 (7.94) 
current claimtl 0.0177 (1.54) 0.0222 (1.87) 
change in value addedt 0.5536 (3.30) 0.5158 (3.11) -0.0744 (1.37) -0.0029 (0.05) 
% ofsales in the domestic market 0.0668 (0.17) 0.0187 (0.05) 0.0995 (0.78) 0.0990 (0.72) 
a single union at the works eouncil -0.2926 (1.08) -0.3012 (1.14) 0.1212 (0.94) 0.2210 (1.63) 
% ofrep. ofCeDO at the we -0.0102 (0.01) 0.0970 (0.17) 0.4351 (1.80) 0.6311 (2.75) 
% ofrep ofregional unions at the we -1.7493 (2.78) -1.6504 (2.66) 0.2940 (1.16) 0.4603 (1.89) 
% ofrep ofUGTat the we -0.7444 (1.49) -0.7001 (1.42) 0.3910 (1.65) 0.5457 (2.42) 
% ofsmall groups at the we -0.4593 (0.84) -0.3725 (0.69) 0.1732 (0.75) 0.3488 (1.55) 
lagged strike duration -0.0152 (1.14) -0.0136 (1.04) -0.0076 (2.05) -0.0070 (1.84) 
bargaining started with delay -0.0799 (0.59) -0.1760 (1.38) 0.2447 (4.05) 0.2333 (3.69) 
COLA signed in the last agreement -0.4163 (2.79) -0.5002 (3.44) -0.1303 (2.14) -0.2122 (3.44) 
lagged employmentl 0.7190 (2.66) 0.7076 (2.67) -0.3355 (4.52) -0.1680 (2.16) 
lagged wagel 0.1960 (0.49) -0.0493 (0.12) 0.3089 (1.13) 0.0097 (0.03) 
lagged (twiee) wagel -0.3618 (2.30) -0.2943 (1.81) 0.0241 (0.55) 0.1172 (2.33) 
industry strike eonjlieting aetivity 0.2736 (3.51) 0.2562 (3.33) 0.0672 (3.66) 0.0471 (2.02) 
industry unemployment rate -0.1404 (0.54) -0.1715 (0.67) 0.1231 (1.52) -0.1153 (1.91) 
ehange in the industry employment 0.4090 (1.29) 0.1385 (0.20) -0.5678 (1.34) 0.0638 (0.94) 
Expeeted level ofinjlation 0.2945 (4.16) 0.3849 (8.00) 0.2610 (7.45) 0.3879 (11.6) 
regional wage ehange signal 0.0512 (1.30) 0.0497 (1.27) 0.0907 (4.94) 0.0811 (4.30) 
nationwide employers referenee offer 0.4444 (6.08) 0.4657 (9.15) 
nationwide union 's referenee claim 0.1261 (1.36) 0.1294 (2.64) 
nationwide unemployment rate -2.3301 (1.95) -2.7426 (4.69) 
nationwide long term unemployment 0.0343 (1.59) 0.1131 (6.60) 
Speci(ieatioll test 
Wald (dj) (19) 567.5(23) (20) 1504.4(24) 
industry dummies (dj) 28.7(7) 31.3(7) 24.1 (7) 26.9(7) 
time dummies (dj) 109.2(5) No 424.2(5) No 
Sargan (dj) 93.47 (90) 98.3 (90) 108.4(106) 123.1(106) 
fose -2.03 -2.02 -5.73 -5.80 
fose 0.40 -0.37 -1.22 -1.44 
Notes: Absolute value t-statistics in brackets. 
The variables marked t have been instrumented. Instruments: Z"Z'.4 for first differences equations and Z"ZI_4 for 
level equations. 
Wald: Wald test ofthe null that the vector ofcoefficients (exc1uding time and industry dummies) is zero. 
Sargan: Test of the validity of the set of instruments used. Under the null of adequacy, the test is distributed as a 
:ir, where r is the number of overidentilYing restrictions. 
fose (sosc): Test ofthe absence offirst (second) order serial correlation in the error terrn (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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Appendix. Data and variables. 
The data used in this study comes from the NCGE, an annual survey about bargaining in 
Spanish large firms (more than 200 employees). Each wave provides information about firm main 
results (sales, value added and profits), employment structure and negotiation by bargaining unit. 
Despite the survey runs since 1978 we only have information for the period 1985-1991. From the 
original database, we have excluded those firms that do not report information about sorne key 
variables such value added, employment, wage increase agreement, initial positions and length of the 
negotiation. The summary statistics, the definition and the source -when necessary- of the variables 
employed are also reported in Table A.l. 
Table A.l. Variables. Descriptive statistics, definition and source. 
Claim sample Ofler SampleQ 
Variables Mean st dev Mean st dev Dejinition (when necessary) 
Inítialoffers and agreement 
Claim 9.835 4.588 10.00 4.690 works council first wage increase c1aim(%) 
Of[er 5.423 1.633 5.333 1.500 firm's first wage increase offer (%) 
Firm variables. 
Value addedper employee 8.563 0.757 8.562 0.750 (in logs) 
% ofsales in the domestic marlcet 86.6 20.8 86.3 21.1 in percentage 
Bargaining unit variables 
A single union at the works council 10.9 31.20 10.2 30.2 dummy (1 =single union at the works council) 
%ofrep.ofCCOOatthewc 36.4 25.10 36.80 24.90 in percentage 
% ofrep ofregional unions at wc 05.5 14.20 5.70 14.40 in percentage 
% ofUGT at the wc 30.6 22.40 3050 22.10 in percentage 
% ofsmall groups at the wc 21.2 27.70 20.50 26.90 in percentage 
Lagged strilee duration 0.157 0.364 0.163 0.369 lagged strike days per emp10yee 
Bargaining startedwith delay 24.5 43.0 23.0 42.1 1 if negotiation starts after the expiration of the 
last agreement 
Lagged COLA signed 74.90 43.40 74.80 43.40 COLA: 1 ifthe last agreement has a COLA 
Lagged employment level 6.418 1.128 6.434 1.100 number of employees in the BU (in logs) 
Laggedwage 8.298 0.39 8.300 0.39 wage bill per emp10yee (in logs) 
Other variables. 
Working days lost per employee 0.445 1.026 0.458 1.063 industry averages -44 industries. (source: BEL) 
Industry unemployment rate 13.45 7.930 13.55 8.050 in percentage -44 industries. (source: EPA) 
Change in industry employment 0.025 0.066 0.025 0.065 44 industries (source: EPA) 
E'Cpected level ofinflation 5.465 1.821 5.407 1.786 ARIMA price increase forecast at the starting 
date ofthe negotiation process 
Regional wage increase signal 7.351 1.380 7.348 1.382 signed in the month preceding the starting date 
ofthe negotiation (%). (source: BEL) 
Employers reference offer 4.342 1.011 4.316 1.013 emp10yers association's year1y prescription 
Unions reference e/aim 7.99 0.994 7.986 0.999 nationwide union's yearly prescription 
National unemployment rate 18.7 2.001 18.6 1.990 in percentage (source: EPA) 
Longterm (+2yr) unemployment 38.4 3.990 38.5 4.040 in percentage (source: EPA) 
Observations per BU 2 3 4 5 6 7 
elaim sample: BU 323 188 77 53 39 22 
Offer sample: BU 299 169 71 53 36 18 
Notes: 
a. The selection criteria is such that the jirm rejects the initial claim 
Sources: 
NCGE: Negociacion Colectiva en las Grandes Empresas. Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda. 
BEL: Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. 
EPA: Encuesta de Poblacion Activa, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. 
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Table 5. Initial offer determination. Alternative specifications. 
Constant 
lagged offerj 
Current c/aimt/ 
Change in value addedt 
% o{sales in the domestic market 
Single union at the works eounci/ 
% olrep. olCCOO at the we 
% olrep olregional unions at the we 
% 01rep 01 UGT at the we 
% 01sma// groups at the we 
Lagged strike duration 
Bargaining started with delay 
COLA signed in the last agreement 
Lagged employmentj 
lagged wagej 
lagged (twiee) wagej 
/ndustry strike eonflicting aetivity 
/ndustry unemployment rate 
Change in industry employment 
Expeeted level 01 inflation 
Regional wage inerease signal 
Nationwide employers relerenee offer 
Nationwide union 's relerenee c/aim 
Natiol1wide unemployment rate 
Nationwide long term unemployment 
Speeijiealioll test 
Wald (dj) 
/ndustry dummies 
Time dummies 
Sargan (dj) 
Fose 
Sose 
Notes: See below table 4 
(1) 
coef. l-sl. 
4.5948 (1.89) 
0.1961 (7.81) 
0.0071 (0.57) 
-0.0544 (0.95) 
0.0726 (0.51) 
-0.1161 (0.85) 
0.3618 (1.44) 
0.2218 (0.79) 
0.2219 (0.86) 
0.2957 (1.21) 
-0.0054 (1.24) 
0.2965 (4.28) 
-0.0817 (1.23) 
-0.3933 (4.56) 
0.1226 (0.41) 
-0.0360 (0.70) 
0.0718 (3.27) 
0.0197(0.23) 
-0.3198 (0.74) 
0.2670 (6.89) 
0.0862 (4.51) 
717.7(20) 
15.6(7) 
107.5(106) 
-5.72 
-1.29 
25 
(2) 
coef. l-sl. 
-7.9842 (3.32) 
0.1496 (5.82) 
0.0070 (0.57) 
0.0416 (0.73) 
0.0100 (0.06) 
-0.0819 (0.58) 
0.6891 (2.99) 
0.5094 (1.90) 
0.2952 (1.19) 
0.6147 (2.65) 
-0.0058 (1.31) 
0.2288 (3.29) 
-0.1787 (2.54) 
-0.1864 (2.21) 
-0.4094 (1.38) 
0.0760 (1.37) 
0.0501 (2.15) 
0.1051 (1.27) 
-0.1257 (0.28) 
0.4502 (12.7) 
0.0807 (4.14) 
0.4268 (7.90) 
0.1469 (2.97) 
-3.5617 (5.88) 
0.0974 (5.31) 
1523.7(24) 
19.7(7) 
129.7(106) 
-6.03 
-1.34 
(3) (4) 
coef. l-sl. Coef. I-SI. 
-0.2251 (0.08) -13.975 (5.30) 
0.2074 (6.60) 0.1561 (4.84) 
-0.0171 (0.96) 0.0054 (0.09) 
-0.0105 (0.19) 0.1529 (0.86) 
0.1858 (1.12) -0.0261 (1.44) 
0.1384 (0.90) 0.2506 (1.56) 
0.5637 (2.22) 0.6916 (2.66) 
0.1200 (0.43) 0.2188 (0.74) 
0.4970 (1.93) 0.4429 (1.68) 
0.1779 (0.70) 0.2564 (0.96) 
-0.0045 (0.96) -0.0049 (0.98) 
0.2349 (3.08) 0.2240 (2.93) 
-0.1517 (1.84) -0.2321 (2.75) 
-0.3141 (2.15) -0.1327 (0.83) 
0.4976 (1.63) 0.2674 (0.87) 
0.0223 (0.40) 0.1001 (1.59) 
0.0965 (3.79) 0.0642 (2.38) 
0.0345 (0.33) 0.0653 (0.56) 
-1.1 012 (2.15) -1.2181 (2.32) 
0.2805 (6.20) 0.4256 (10.4) 
0.0770 (3.61) 0.0702 (3.26) 
0.4829 (7.73) 
0.2254 (3.45) 
-2.2854 (3.07) 
0.1364 (6.82) 
777.7(20) 1080.6(24) 
14.9(7) 20.3(7) 
377.9(5) 
66.98(67) 87.8(67) 
-5.41 -5.15 
-1.09 -1.10 
